Stories

The Emerging Conservatism of the Anglosphere

Michael Lindsay
June 19, 2009
There are those in my gown town who believe that every political idea expressed in the Anglosphere originates in the United Kingdom. This belief draws indignation from the city’s colonial contingent, which champions the contributions of non-Britons from Rand to Kymlicka. However, we colonials are forced to admit that, particularly over the past thirty years, it has typically been in Britain where global shifts in political attitudes have first been fully expressed in political platforms.
Stories

The Emerging Conservatism of the Anglosphere

Michael Lindsay
June 19, 2009
There are those in my gown town who believe that every political idea expressed in the Anglosphere originates in the United Kingdom. This belief draws indignation from the city’s colonial contingent, which champions the contributions of non-Britons from Rand to Kymlicka. However, we colonials are forced to admit that, particularly over the past thirty years, it has typically been in Britain where global shifts in political attitudes have first been fully expressed in political platforms.
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There are those in my gown town who believe that every political idea expressed in the Anglosphere originates in the United Kingdom. This belief draws indignation from the city’s colonial contingent, which champions the contributions of non-Britons from Rand to Kymlicka. However, we colonials are forced to admit that, particularly over the past thirty years, it has typically been in Britain where global shifts in political attitudes have first been fully expressed in political platforms.

When the momentum of the politics of collectivism abated in the 1970s, it was in Britain that Margaret Thatcher reached into her infamous handbag at a shadow cabinet meeting, produced Friedrich Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty, and defiantly committed her party to the strict methodological individualism of the Austrian School. Presaging global exhaustion with paternalism, Lady Thatcher predicated her platform on a minimalist conception of the state, and swept decisively to power. Shortly thereafter, Ronald Reagan and Brian Mulroney, predisposed to individualism, but undeniably emboldened by Thatcher’s success, emulated her evocative ideological evolution and also won staggering electoral majorities.

When the momentum of the politics of individualism stalled in the early 1990s, it was in Britain that Tony Blair made the work of sociologist Anthony Giddens the explicit basis of his reformulation of the Labour Party. Anticipating the sea-change in political attitudes that would accompany the consolidation of the post-scarcity economy, Blair designed his ‘New Labour’ project to offer voters an alternative to the increasingly outdated politics of socio-economic conflict. Shortly after Blair swept to power, his ideological formulation also traversed the Atlantic, as Bill Clinton and Jean Chrétien modified their pragmatic centrism, taking onboard the ideology of the ‘Third Way’ in an attempt to replicate the re-alignment of the middle-class Blair had achieved.

Now, in 2007, as the momentum of the ‘third way’ governments is almost spent, we are once again witnessing the ideological rebirth of entrenched opposition parties across the Anglosphere. Once again, it is in Britain where this rebirth seems to be progressing most rapidly towards a political platform derived, ostensibly, from a cohesive ideology which captures the attitudes of the age. Conservative Party leader David Cameron has set about creating an explicitly conservative version of the ‘third way’ project, which incorporates elements of the collectivist conception of justice into a party platform which has recently focused almost exclusively upon guaranteeing negative freedoms. British Conservatives, who typically viewed justice as philosophically important only insofar as it related to law and order, are now enthusiastically embracing a political morality based around the ideals of social justice.

While Cameron has been more explicit about this ideological mutation than any of his conservative contemporaries, he has certainly not been alone in undertaking it. Around the Anglosphere, conservatives are proving increasingly willing to espouse collectivist justifications for policy positions, even in those cases where classic liberal dogma might serve them just as well. Take, for instance, the environment, which is the undeniable issue du jour. While it is to be expected that political actors will invoke our duty to future generations emotively as the cause for embracing issues ecological, it is noteworthy that many conservatives have recently converted to the cause without even a cursory allusion to Adam Smith’s commentary on negative externalities. This stands in stark contrast to the rhetoric of conservatives like Mulroney, who always framed environmental issues as ‘collective action’ problems that mandated government involvement. Appeals to ideals of social justice have also become increasingly prominent in the statements of conservatives on subjects as diverse as federalism, trade policy, cultural policy, tax policy, and health.

This article, using Cameron’s Conservatives as exemplar, examines the forces producing a new brand of conservatism, which might be coming soon to a ballot box near you. It argues that, just as the political trends of the age identified by Giddens in his book The Third Way altered the political attitudes of the Anglosphere in a manner that constrained collectivism in social democratic politics, so too are these same trends now constraining individualism in conservative politics. In short, the ‘fourth way’ is almost upon us.

Political Trend # 1 ~ Globalization

In The Third Way, Giddens argues that social democrats misconstrue globalization if they treat it as only, or even primarily, an economic phenomenon. As he conceives of it, globalization is not about economic interdependence, but about the transformation of time and space, which increasingly allows individual decisions to have a global impact. He argues that the practical effect of this transformation will be the withering of existing social structures (particularly the nation-state), and he urges social democrats to take note of how the ‘upward’ pressures of globalization are inducing people to view themselves as individuals, rather than as members of a class or collective. Heeding his advice, Blair and Clinton (and Chrétien after winning election) became vocal supporters of free trade, thereby disappointing a core constituency in organized labour, but widening their appeal amongst the growing number of voters who viewed their interests as being determined by factors independent of their domestic economic position.

However, as authors from Stiglitz to Ralston Saul have discussed, globalization’s ability to lead us to self-conceive as autonomous individuals has proven far more limited than we might have ever imagined. Recent years have revealed that, even within stable nations that overwhelmingly benefit from globalization, there is a powerful feedback effect that attends the process, prompting the rediscovery and reassertion of old tribal identities. Practically, this has meant that, on the right and the left, protectionists, nationalists, and ethnocentrics have begun to imperil the traditional electoral coalitions of the mainstream parties, forcing politicians to race to account for their agendas. This crisis is a particularly acute one for the right as, unlike with the ‘Browns’ of the left (Gordon & Sherrod), the challenges to established conservative parties are being mounted by forces external to the parties themselves. Faced with this growing nationalist and protectionist sentiment, it is perhaps little surprise that conservative politicians have become more vocal about their reservations concerning a liberalized global economy, and have begun using collectivist rationales for their reticence.

As promised, Britain offers a prime example: Cameron faces a significant challenge from both the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the British Nationalist Party (BNP). Indeed, the Conservatives narrowly would have won the popular vote in the 2005 general election if the 3% of voters that cast a vote for these two parties had voted Conservative instead.(i) Little wonder, then, that Cameron has proven consistently Thatcher-esque with respect to the future of Britain’s relationship with the European Union. Critically, however, as Mr. Cameron himself details in an editorial written for The Guardian, he does not premise his euro-skepticism upon the “patriotism or narrow nationalism” which tinges the platforms of all conservative parties regardless of how liberal their economic agenda.(ii) Rather, he frets that “the right interest rate for Westphalia might not be the right interest rate for West Oxfordshire” and seeks to ensure that “British interest rates are set to suit British needs”.(iii) Thus, whereas the neo-liberal Thatcher rejected the case for European integration because she thought the continent’s central bankers too inept to successfully compete in the global economy, and didn’t want the prosperity of Britain anchored to bloated French social programs, Cameron patently means to offer a collectivist rationale for retaining the pound. Put another way, instead of offering a nationalist argument based on an implicit assertion of superiority (consistent with traditional conservative nationalism), Cameron is articulating a protectionist argument premised on a conception of economic citizenship recently seen only in the manifestos of trade unions.

This resurgence of economic patriotism, largely dormant in conservative policy since the time of Theodore Roosevelt, is the result of globalization leading individuals to view the assertion of their economic ‘rights’ as citizens as a surety against the instability of global markets. That protectionism is more pronounced in Britain’s conservative circles is to be expected, given the salience of the question of European integration. However, anyone seeking evidence that the ‘downward’ pressures of globalization are similarly impacting conservative politics in North America needs look no further than the upcoming debate on President Bush’s fast-track trade promotion authority (TPA). The Republican coalition which delivered Bush a victory on TPA by a single vote the last time around was perhaps best described as shaky, and with Congress now controlled by ‘Lou Dobbs’ Democrats, the actual desire of congressional Republicans to cast a vote for free trade will be tested. Should Bush’s TPA not be renewed, the bilateral agreements that his administration plans to finalize with Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia this coming year will prove particularly divisive for the GOP. Ultimately, when CATO’s Centre for Trade Policy finally ranks the trade credentials of the 111th Congress, it seems doubtful that congressional Republicans will come close to matching the near 90% support rate they have recently maintained.(iv)

In the final analysis, globalization is having a deeply contradictory effect upon political attitudes in the Anglosphere. While globalization has engendered individualist sentiment, the relative instability of the global market, combined with the reluctance of certain areas of the economy (particularly manufacturing) to adapt to global pressures, has ushered in a new wave of protectionism. Conservatives now prescribe economic individualism at their considerable peril, and many have begun to infuse their rhetoric with collectivist ideals.

Political Trend # 2 ~ Institutionalized Individualism

According to Giddens, the individualism produced by globalization is reinforced by the retreat of custom and tradition from our lives. He argues that, while younger generations are actually sensitized to a greater range of moral concerns than previous generations, they do not relate their values to tradition, and are significantly less likely to accept the legitimacy of traditional forms of authority legislating on questions of lifestyle. As such, Giddens argues that social cohesion can no longer be guaranteed by the top-down action of the state or by appeal to tradition, but rather, only by ensuring that all members of society actively accept responsibility for the consequences of their actions and the habits they adopt. In this argument, one can see the germ of the welfare reforms passed by Blair and Clinton, which emphasized the responsibilities that attached to the benefits received by those on the dole. One can also see the premise for the changes made to the nature of social benefits by ‘third way’ governments, which increasingly emphasized individual provision, and de-emphasized familial provision. Through these types of changes, ‘third way’ politicians hoped to tap further into emerging individualist sentiment.

Paradoxically, of course, this institutionalized individualism encourages a conception of society which is decidedly collectivist. By emphasizing the responsibilities of those who benefit from state programs, this approach also implicitly emphasized the responsibilities of the state to its citizens, and also points the way towards a discussion of the reciprocal duties that citizens owe each other. Even more insidiously from the conservative point of view, this approach actively promotes the notion that the state is uniquely responsible for the provision of social benefits. On some level, the rise of institutionalized individualism has led to unquestioning acceptance of a robust version of social contract theory, minus the collective provision desired by old-school social democrats. Thus, conservatives are forced to grapple with the reduced importance of tradition, the diminished salience of collectives they’re inclined to support (family, churches, etc.), and are forced to deal with the fact that institutionalized individualism prompts a discussion of social justice.

For his part, Cameron has embraced both institutional individualism and the social justice discourse it demands. Early in his tenure as leader, Cameron announced that the first of the policy groups that he was establishing would focus on social justice. Calling Britain a “broken society” and proclaiming himself “committed to social action for social justice”, Cameron promised to study the systemic causes of poverty in Britain.(v) In a moment truly telling of the extent to which he has adopted the perspective of social contract theory, he also pledged to examine how best to “expand the scope of corporate citizenship” in the nation, as a means to dealing with persistent inequality.(vi) Needless to say, these policies are quite a good deal removed from those prescribed by Thatcher’s ideological muse, Hayek, who once wrote a book entitled The Mirage of Social Justice. It should be understood that Cameron’s adoption of social justice as a cause in not merely a method of demonstrating his compassion to a cynical audience; he is responding to the growing number of citizens who see government as uniquely responsible for addressing social ills.

Conservatives in North America are under similar pressure to reconsider their position on government involvement in promoting social justice, although political realities unique to the continent have masked this trend. In the United States, the importance of faith groups in political debate has made ‘social justice’ a much contested concept, allowing political actors to claim to support it even if they consider it as being primarily related to the right of society not to be oppressed by a radical social agenda. It is worth noting, however, that surveys have shown American evangelicals increasingly likely to rank the assuagement of poverty as a top priority (for example, Republican presidential candidate Senator Sam Brownback), and given the influence of these groups in Republican politics, it is naïve to assume that this trend won’t have knock-on effects for GOP policy. Canada, for its part, has a long history of debating social justice in the guise of federal equalization payments, which has made it routine for politicians of all stripes to accept it at a macro-level. The link between institutional individualism and social justice is perhaps most discernable, however, in Canada’s resurgent urban agenda, with its dual focus on the outdated nature of rural subsidies (institutional individualism) and the need to deal with the root causes of urban poverty (social justice). Whereas old conservative city councilors used to focus on urban poverty primarily because of its link to crime, new conservative councilors are as likely to discuss it in communitarian terms.

Ultimately then, while Giddens was correct in arguing that institutionalized individualism forced social democrats to find new balance between individual responsibility and social provision, it has also forced conservatives to find their own balance. This has led many conservatives to almost subliminally accept the state’s role in the provision of social benefits as indispensable, and has led them to contemplate more seriously what we might owe each other as citizens of a society. This has definitely served as a brake on individualism.

Political Trend # 3 ~ Postmodernism & Political Agency

Giddens argues that a development concomitant with the decreasing deference of industrial populations is the devaluation of political parties. Scholars from Inglehart to Beck have produced research which empirically demonstrates this hypothesis, revealing a precipitous drop in expressions of trust for the machinery of orthodox politics across the industrial world. Unlike many scholars, however, Giddens argues that, rather than representing a process of depoliticization, the draining away of influence from parties is best conceived of as the spread of political engagement and activism. He argues that, constituting themselves as individuals, and faced with the immobility of party structures, citizens are increasingly likely to seek political engagement through social movements which focus on a discrete number of issues. Pointing to the popularity and success of groups like Greenpeace and Oxfam, Giddens argues that social democratic parties need to emulate the organizational structure of these groups in order to recruit younger members. Consistent with his advice, centre-left parties around the world have recently been engaged in a war with their trade union progenitors, attempting to reduce the institutional influence of these groups in party decision-making. Blair has made the most progress in this respect, having substantially reduced the number of delegates to the Labour Conference that are automatically selected by grace of their position in a trade union.

As well as affecting social democrats, the “hollowing out” of political parties has affected conservatives. Increasingly, the policies of conservative parties are being determined by conservative social movement organizations, rather than determined at party conferences. The paradox here is that, while the rise of social movement organizations might represent the sort of individual ownership of political self that the right would welcome, given the durability of political parties as the preference aggregators of politics, the transformation of party policy process in competitions between interest groups might actually impede individualistic expression of preferences. These days, instead of a group of individuals with pluralistic preferences debating policy, single issue lobbies now fight to colonize certain elements of party platforms. Political parties, strapped for cash and members, are increasingly willing to let this happen. Thus, while the policy formulation processes of social movements might be more focused on individual input, it is less than clear whether their new importance in political life allows for any given individual’s policy preferences to have more salience in the political process.

Once again, the British Conservative Party offers an informative example. Shortly after establishing his social justice policy group, Cameron tapped the editor of the Ecologist magazine, Zac Goldsmith, to determine the party’s environmental policy for the coming election. This move was aimed at making the party more appealing to the thousands of Britons who have recently joined environmental lobbies. Goldsmith, who is unabashedly anti-globalization, and who has been quoted as saying he would only vote Conservative “if drugged”, has been given a metaphorical and literal “blank check” by Cameron.(vii) It is widely expected that he will recommend large tax increases on fuel, a halt to the further expansion of Britain’s nuclear energy policy, and a comprehensive series of regulations. In a recent interview with the BBC, demonstrating his awareness of the power he wields, Goldsmith declared that, given the media bazaar which accompanied the announcement of his appointment, it was “just not conceivable” that Cameron could refuse to take up his recommendations.(viii) To summarize, in an effort to curry favour with individuals inclined to vote for his party, but whose political engagement is now primarily achieved through new social movements, Cameron has ceded authority over party policy to a handful of public intellectuals who claim to represent those Britons concerned with the environment. But of course, Goldsmith can’t purport to speak for all of the environmental groups that are currently operating in Britain, let alone purport to be the best arbiter of his readers’ pluralistic preferences concerning public policy. Therefore, while Ecologist readers may have a larger hand in determining the editorial content of the magazine, and while Oxfam might allow its members more democratic input into determining the advocacy goals of the organization, an argument can be made that the displacement of the individual as the fundamental component of party policy processes by these new interest groups represents greater deference to a multiplicity of authorities.

Once again, political quirks particular to North America are masking the effect of this trend in Canada and the United States, but there can be no doubt that the growing power of these social groups, relative to political parties, is affecting conservative policy-making. In his work, Epstein discusses how the political parties of North America (particularly in the U.S.) have never had the mass membership of European political parties, meaning that interest groups have historically played a much larger role in the formulation of party policy. However, from the Moral Majority to REAL Women, individuals are increasingly being represented before party structures by the leaders of the organizations with which they choose to associate.

Thus, if political parties continue to lose ground to social movements where membership is concerned, if centrifugal forces and electoral systems keep the number of parties in any given system low, and if the use of majoritarian options such as referenda continues to be rare, will it be reasonable to say that citizens are more constituted as individuals in the political sense? Parties seem to stand ready to abet this trend as they seek to co-opt these movements, rather than re-constituting their internal process.

Conclusion

In political science, two assumptions are commonly used to understand the behaviour of political actors and parties. The first holds that, above all else, political actors seek to be elected. The second holds that, pursuant to the goal of election, political parties will alter their platforms in an effort to capture the median voter in society. In the mid-1990s, social democrats were forced to face the fact that political trends had made citizens more likely to constitute themselves politically as individuals. This realization led to the creation of the ‘third way’ movement, by which social democratic parties altered both their form and policies in order to be more appealing to the median voter. Today, conservative parties face similar pressures. Protectionism, social justice and postmodernism beckon, as the very trends that dictated the necessity of the ‘third way’ evolution now compel conservatives to consider collectivism anew. This ‘fourth way’ will be difficult to distinguish from the ‘third way’, leading many disaffected neo-liberal pundits to charge that conservatives like Cameron are selling out in order to be elected. While there is likely some truth behind this indictment, it would be wrong to suggest that the ideological evolution of conservative parties being seen across the Anglosphere isn’t demanded, at least in part, by political realities. Political trends might force even the staunchest Thatcherite to tread, albeit lightly, the road to serfdom in the coming years. However, conservatives shouldn’t allow this change to happen without debating it openly and honestly. Instead of gravitating surreptitiously towards the median voter, conservatives should be seriously considering the extent to which political trends have altered their world view. Indeed, the only thing that is truly alarming about the ‘fourth way’ iteration is that, unlike previous ideological paradigm shifts, there has been little scholarly and public debate about it. Personally, this author is anxious to see this debate play out on the pages of this publication.

Michael Lindsay is a doctoral candidate at Oxford University’s Department of Political Science and International Relations. His current research concerns constitutional development and evolution in deeply divided societies. His other research interests include the construction of national identities, multiculturalism, federalism, and international relations. He has authored numerous articles and editorials for publications ranging from the Oxonian Review to the National Post. In addition to his research, Michael also operates his own strategic consultancy firm, which caters to institutional clients in the education and not-for-profit sectors.

Endnotes

i. Election 2005. BBC News. 8 September, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/vote_2005/constituencies/default.stm

ii. Cameron, David. “Cash in Hand.” The Guardian. 8 July, 2002.

iii. Cameron, David. “Cash in Hand.” The Guardian. 8 July, 2002.

iv. Griswold, Daniel. “Free Trade, Free Markets: Rating the 108th Congress” Trade Policy Analysis 28 (2005) P. 11.

v. Cameron Seeking Social Justice. BBC News. 7 December, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4507404.stm

vi. Cameron Seeking Social Justice. BBC News. 7 December, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4507404.stm

vii. Interview: Zac Goldsmith. BBC News. 11 January, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4544600.stm

viii. Interview: Zac Goldsmith. BBC News. 11 January, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4544600.stm

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